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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involves a dispute between an insurance agent and insurance companies, the

contracts that exist between them and bonus commissions being sought by the insurance agent.
This case also involves the improper use of proprietary client information by the insurance agent
with a new insurance company after his contract was terminated by the companies.
Appellant BRIAN TRUMBLE (hereafter “Appellant”) worked for several years under
contract as an insurance agent for Respondents/Cross-Appellants FARM BUREAU MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO, an Idaho corporation; WESTERN COMMUNITY
INSURANCE CO., an Idaho corporation; FARM INSURANCE BROKERAGE CO., INC., an
Idaho corporation, (hereafter collectively referred to as “Farm Bureau” unless specified otherwise).
Due to conduct and actions that Farm Bureau learned about, it terminated all contracts with
Appellant on May 4, 2016.
On May 23, 2016, Appellant filed a Complaint against Farm Bureau alleging that his
contracts had been terminated illegally and claiming that he was entitled to an immediate payment
of a Service Bonus Commission in the sum of $251,431.96.1 On June 3, 2016, Appellant filed a
motion for summary judgment seeking a declaratory judgment that the 1 year non-competition
clause in the contracts were unenforceable and that payment of a Service Bonus Commission was

1

R. at 17-51.
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mandatory and should be paid immediately.2 On July 19, 2016, Farm Bureau opposed Appellant’s
summary judgment arguing that the 1-year non-competition clause was enforceable. Further, Farm
Bureau argued that it terminated the contract due to Appellant’s conduct which would preclude
the payment of the Service Bonus Commission. Additionally, Farm Bureau argued that even if
Appellant’s conduct had not precluded payment, Appellant had not yet fully complied with the
eligibility requirements, including the 1-year non-competition clause, in order to qualify for the
Service Bonus Commission.3
On August 2, 2016, the District Court reviewed the briefs presented by the parties and
conducted oral arguments. Thereafter, on August 31, 2016, the District Court entered its Order re:
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, wherein it denied summary judgment, relying on
Anderson v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 112 Idaho 461, 732 P.2d 699 (Ct. App. 1987).4
The District Court determined that the 1-year non-competition and forfeiture clauses of the kind
at issue were enforceable as a matter of law.5
On February 14, 2017, Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration.6 On March 10, 2017,
Appellant filed his brief.7 On March 17, 2017, and April 11, 2017, Farm Bureau filed its

2

R. at 88-107.
R. at 178-203.
4
R. at 245-254.
5
R. at 250-253.
6
R. at 255-256, and R. at 257-258 respectively.
7
Appellant did not include this on the Clerk’s record.
3

5

Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration.8 The District Court took the matter under advisement
and thereafter entered its Memorandum Decision and Order9 and again ruled against the Appellant
and in favor of Farm Bureau.10
It was later discovered by Farm Bureau that on August 10, 2016, Plaintiff began using a
list of names of Farm Bureau customers, to directly compete against Farm Bureau by sending out
a solicitation letter to Farm Bureau’s clients and customers on behalf of another insurance
company.11

Appellant defiantly declared that “my customers/clients were mine, not Farm

Bureau’s.”12
On August 14, 2017, Farm Bureau amended its Answer to add a Counterclaim against
Appellant, claiming he had violated the Idaho Trade Secrets Act by using proprietary information
to compete against Farm Bureau, and that he had intentionally interfered with Farm Bureau’s
prospective economic advantage.13
On December 6, 2017, Farm Bureau filed its Motion for Summary Judgment.14 Appellant
filed a Cross Motion for Summary Judgment.15

8

R. at 315-327, and 350-365.
R. at 449-468.
10
R. at 467.
11
R. at 766, see also R. at 641-643.
12
R. at 643, paragraph 12.
13
R. at 506-531.
14
R. at 760-778.
15
R. at 823-834.
9
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On January 26, 2018, the District Court entered a Memorandum Decision and Order which
granted Appellant’s summary judgment and dismissed Farm Bureau’s counterclaims.16
Then on January 30, 2018, the District Court granted Farm Bureau’s motion for summary
judgment. The District Court found that Appellant admitted that he competed with Farm Bureau
within 4 months of the termination of his contract in violation of the 1-year non-competition clause
and therefore was not entitled to the Service Bonus Commission.17
Appellant appealed and Farm Bureau cross-appealed.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The following undisputed facts support the District Court’s decision that Appellant’s

actions and conduct in competing with Farm Bureau in violation of the 1-year non-competition
clause make him ineligible to receive the Service Bonus Commission.

Additionally, the

undisputed facts support reversing the decision by the District Court that Appellant’s conduct
violated the Idaho Trade Secrets Act and that Appellant intentionally interfered with Farm
Bureau’s prospective economic advantages. These undisputed facts are as follows:
1.

Appellant began working as an insurance agent for Farm Bureau in December 1995,

by executing a Career Agent’s Contract.18 As an insurance agent, Appellant was not an employee

16

R. at 875-894.
R. at 114-115.
18
R. at 116-117.
17
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but rather was an independent contractor.19 Farm Bureau agrees that according to the Career
Agent’s Contract, Appellant would be paid “according to the Career Agent’s Commission
Schedule in force on the effective date of the policies to which the commission relates.”
2.

However, the undisputed fact is that the effective Career Agent’s Commission

Schedule is not the one Appellant points to in his Appellant’s Brief.20 Rather, it is undisputed that
the effective Career and Special Agent’s Commission Schedule applicable to Appellant is dated
effective January 1, 2008.21
3.

In his Appellant’s brief, Appellant confuses this schedule with the several Career

Agent’s Service Bonus Commission Memorandums of Understanding (hereafter “Service Bonus
Commission MOU”), which were updated and in effect during certain years when Appellant
worked as an agent for Farm Bureau.22 It is undisputed that the only Service Bonus Commission
MOU that was in effect when Appellant’s contract was terminated was dated January 1, 2011.23
The 2011 Service Bonus Commission MOU is at the center of the issues in this case.24

19

R. at 28, paragraph 2; and Appellant’s admission that he was an independent contractor: R. at
723, paragraph 6; and R. at 643, paragraph 12.
20
See Appellant’s Brief page 4, referring this Court to the Career Agent’s Service Bonus
Commission (See Appellant’s reference to R. at 122-123 or at 221-222).
21
R. at 211-212.
22
R. at 213-222, and 742-743.
23
R. at 742-743.
24
To clear up some additional confusion, the 2011 Service Bonus Commission MOU is found in
the record at pages 122-123 and at 742-743. Appellant’s reference to the record at pages 221-222
is an earlier version of the MOU that was not effective at the time Appellant’s contract was
terminated and is therefore not at issue in this case.
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4.

The Career Agent’s Contract allows either party to terminate the contract at any

time with or without cause.25
5.

The plain language in the 2011 Service Bonus Commission MOU states that a

Service Bonus Commission is not “earned” but rather is credited to an agent, with interest, pending
the agent’s fulfilling all of the qualifying requirements which then makes the agent “eligible” to
receive the Service Bonus Commission.26
6.

The 2011 Service Bonus Commission MOU specifically defines the qualifying

requirements that an agent would have to fulfill in order to be “eligible” for the Service Bonus
Commission.27 The plain language states in four (4) different paragraphs that in order to be eligible
for the Service Bonus Commission the agent must satisfy the 1-year non-competition clause.28
7.

The 2011 Service Bonus Commission MOU also states that “No service bonus

commission will be paid to any agent committing fraud, dishonesty or other material agent
misconduct.”29

Additionally, the plain language also states that, “A violation of the no-

competition restriction will result in a forfeiture of the service bonus commission and interest
credited.”30 Finally, the language declares that, “Any commission credit which does not become
payable to agent will revert back to the Companies.”31

25

R. at 117, paragraph 10.
R. at 742-743.
27
Id.
28
R. at 742, first full paragraph, and at 743, first, second and third full paragraphs.
29
R. at 743, third full paragraph, last sentence.
30
R. at 743, second full paragraph last sentence.
31
R. at 743, first full paragraph last sentence.
26

9

8.

In addition to the language in the 2011 Service Bonus Commission MOU,

Appellant also received a letter every year from Farm Bureau that provided an update concerning
the Service Bonus Commission. This letter would remind Appellant that all requirements of the
program would have to be met before and after termination of his contract for him to receive the
Service Bonus Commission. A copy of such a letter is attached to Appellant’s affidavit with
Appellant admitting that he received these letters every year.32
9.

Farm Bureau learned of conduct and actions taken by Appellant that it believed was

dishonest. As a result, on May 4, 2016, in a meeting with Appellant, the Career Agent’s Contract
was terminated which ended Appellant’s position as an agent of Farm Bureau. Appellant was told
in this meeting that due to his dishonest conduct and based on the language in the 2011 Service
Bonus Commission MOU, Appellant would not receive a Service Bonus Commission.
10.

On May 5, 2016, Appellant’s counsel sent a letter to Farm Bureau requesting that

it restore Appellant as an agent, and further requesting that Farm Bureau immediately pay to
Appellant the Service Bonus Commission.33
11.

In response, on May 9, 2016, Farm Bureau’s counsel sent a letter to Appellant,34

stating that Appellant would not be reinstated as an agent by Farm Bureau. Additionally, in
response to Appellant’s request for the immediate payment of the Service Bonus Commission, the
letter cites to the language in the 2011 Service Bonus Commission MOU about the bonus not being

32

R. at 125 and at 177.
R. at 371-376.
34
R. at 384-385.
33
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paid when the agent is involved in dishonest conduct. The dishonest conduct Farm Bureau
believed Appellant had participated in was then described. The letter then states, “Further, even
if [Appellant] were entitled to his service bonus, the Memorandum contains a non-competition
clause restricting payment until after compliance for a 12-month period.”35
12.

On May 10, 2016, Appellant’s counsel sent another letter to Farm Bureau stating

that Appellant’s financial situation was very poor. As a result, Appellant “simply cannot live off
[a settlement amount] of $50,000 for a year while supporting his family. [Appellant] is clearly in
an untenable position.”36
13.

Appellant rejected settlement and filed his complaint on May 23, 2016, beginning

this litigation.37
14.

It is undisputed that Appellant voluntarily dismissed its cause of action for punitive

damages.38 It is unclear why Appellant included any reference to this causes of action in its Brief.39
15.

In the course of the litigation Farm Bureau learned that Appellant had violated the

1-year non-competition clause set forth in the 2011 Service Bonus Commission MOU by admitting
that he began working for a competitor of Farm Bureau.40 Additionally, Farm Bureau learned that
Appellant had used proprietary Farm Bureau client information that included policy numbers,

35

R. at 384, first sentence in the last paragraph.
R. at 155.
37
R. at 17-51.
38
R. at 916.
39
See Appellant’s Brief page 8.
40
Aug. at 2, paragraph 6; and Aug. at 12, Request for Admission No. 44 and Response.
36

11

addresses and phone numbers, as well customer buying preferences and the history of customer
purchases to create a list while he was working as an agent for Farm Bureau, that he then took and
used after his contract was terminated to solicit current Farm Bureau customers in direct
competition against Farm Bureau.41 Farm Bureau amended its Answer and added counterclaims
against Appellant claiming he had violated the Idaho Trade Secrets Act by using proprietary
information to compete against Farm Bureau, and that he had intentionally interfered with Farm
Bureau’s prospective economic advantage by targeting current clients Farm Bureau had contracts
with.42
16.

Evidence supporting Farm Bureau’s claims is provided by the Second Affidavit of

Thomas J. Lyons which includes a copy of the solicitation letter and forms that were sent out by
Appellant in August of 2016.43
17.

Additionally, while Appellant asserts that he did not “use any Farm Bureau records

or data to create the Subject List”, his testimony is contradicted by his own admissions in his
affidavit that “a few names on the Subject List (approximately 20 or so) came from my old
commission statements and calendars.”44

41

Aug. at 2-3, paragraph 7; Aug. at 3-4, paragraphs 9-18; and Aug. at 18-26 (Note: this copy of
Commission Statements are redacted by Farm Bureau, but Appellant testified that the copy he has
is not redacted. See Aug. at 57, page 114-115).
42
R. at 506-531.
43
R. at 693-699.
44
R. at 642 paragraph 7.
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18.

When asked how many Farm Bureau clients responded to his solicitation letter,

Appellant further admitted that he “probably got more than 30” though he doesn’t know the exact
number.45
19.

When asked about this during his deposition, Appellant then admitted that 20-30

names on what he claims to be his self-created “Subject List”46 came from calendars and
commission statements that he had obtained while working as an agent for Farm Bureau.47 These
commission statements contained customer names, customer buying preferences and the history
of customer purchases.48
20.

Appellant also admitted that his “Subject List” was created from names and contact

information that he obtained from the proprietary renewal notices his office received from Farm
Bureau while he was working as an agent.49 Appellant testified that these renewal notices were
designed to help create renewal letters that would be sent out to clients so they would renew their
policies with Farm Bureau.50

45

Aug. at 4, paragraph 21; and Aug. 68-69, deposition page 161 lines 6-25, and page 162 lines 116.
46
Aug. at
47
Aug. at 4, paragraphs 18-20; and Aug. at 18-26.
48
Aug. at 18-26.
49
Aug. at 64, page 144, lines 5-19.
50
Aug. at 64-65, pages 144-147.
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21.

Appellant made it a point to testify that the renewal lists were not sent to him

individually but rather were sent to his office for the “gals that worked for Farm Bureau” “to send
out renewal letters letting clients know, hey it’s time to do your renewal.”51
22.

Appellant also testified that he was only selling insurance for Farm Bureau and not

for any other company, when he created the “Subject List” and that it contained a list of current
Farm Bureau clients and prospective clients.52
23.

There is no dispute on the record that when Farm Bureau compared the names on

Appellant’s self-created “Subject List” to that of the proprietary commission statements Appellant
received from Farm Bureau while working as an agent, there were 107 names that matched. The
commission statements contained the names of the insured individuals, policy numbers and the
amount of insurance premiums that were purchased by these 107 Farm Bureau customers.53
Appellant also admitted that the Commission Statements showed a history of the purchases and
payments made by Farm Bureau clients.54
24.

In response to Farm Bureau’s counterclaim that he misused trade secrets and

proprietary information in creating the “Subject List” Appellant defiantly maintains that his
“customers/clients were mine, not Farm Bureau’s.”55

51

Aug. at 64, page 144, lines 16-25, and page 145, lines 1-2.
Aug. 64, page 142, lines 3-20.
53
Aug. at 5, paragraphs 25-26.
54
Aug. at 4, paragraph 16; and Aug. at 62, page 136 lines 8-25 and page 137 lines1-13.
55
R. at 643, paragraph 12.
52
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The following issues have been identified and/or argued by the Appellant in the Appellant’s
Brief:
1. By its terms, does the non-compete in the Commission Contract apply if Farm Bureau
terminates the Commission Contract?
2. Are the non-compete and forfeiture provisions in the Commission Contract enforceable as
a matter of law?
3. Do Farm Bureau’s statements create a question of fact as to whether Appellant was
required to comply [with] the terms of the non-compete under the doctrines of futility,
anticipatory repudiation, and/or estoppel?
4. Is Appellant entitled to attorneys’ fees on appeal?

In addition, Farm Bureau identifies the following issues it raised on Cross-Appeal:
1. Whether the District Court properly dismissed Farm Bureau’s Counterclaim for
violation of the Idaho Trade Secrets Act?
2. Whether the District Court properly dismissed Farm Bureau’s Counterclaim for
interference with prospective economic advantage?
3. Whether Farm Bureau is entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal as a matter of
law?

15

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Farm Bureau is entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal as a matter of law
pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3), and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1). Idaho Code § 12-120(3) specifically gives the
Court the authority to award Farm Bureau its attorney fees and costs. Specifically, § 12-120(3)
states:
In any civil action to recover on an open account [or] account stated
. . . relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or services
and in any commercial transaction unless otherwise provided by law, the
prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney’s fee to be set by the
court, to be taxed and collected as costs. The term “commercial transaction”
is defined to mean all transactions except transactions for personal or
household purposes. The term “party” is defined to mean any person,
partnership, corporation, association, private organization, the state of Idaho or
political subdivision thereof.
Idaho Code § 12-120(3)(italics added).
The Idaho Supreme Court reaffirmed its previous decision that “[w]here a party alleges the
existence of a contractual relationship of a type embraced by section 12-120(3) . . . that claim
triggers the application of [I.C. § 12-120(3)] and a prevailing party may recover fees even though
no liability under a contract was established.” Garner v. Povey, 151 Idaho 462, 469, 259 P.3d 608,
615 (2011), citing, Farmers Nat. Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 73, 878 P.2d 762, 772 (1994).
There is no dispute that the Farm Bureau entered into contracts with Appellant who was an
independent contractor to act as an insurance agent for Farm Bureau. Appellant alleges this
contractual relationship in his Third Amended Complaint.56 As a result, this type of a transaction

56

R. at 732.
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specifically qualifies as a commercial transaction as defined by the Idaho Code and Farm Bureau
should be awarded its reasonable attorney fees and costs as a matter of law. For these reasons,
Farm Bureau respectfully requests that it be awarded its reasonable attorney fees and costs
associated with these appellate proceedings.
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND ARGUMENT
I.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW
The summary judgment rendered by the District Court in favor of Farm Bureau was proper,

but the summary judgment rendered by the District Court against Farm Bureau was improper based
on the record. Summary Judgment is appropriate when “. . . the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to Judgment as a matter of law.” State v.
Rubbermaid, 129 Idaho 353 (1996) citing to McCoy v. Lions, 120 Idaho 765, 769 (1991).
Once the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue, the burden shifts to the
nonmoving party to make a showing of the existence of a genuine issue of material fact on the
elements challenged by the moving party. Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527,
530-31, 887 P.2d 1034, 1037-38 (1994). It is well settled in Idaho that in order to create a genuine
issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must present more than just conclusory
assertions, or assumptions or beliefs that an issue of material fact exists. Van Velson Corp. v.
Westwood Mall Assoc., 126 Idaho 401, 406, 884 P.2d 414, 419, (1994). “Rather, the [opposing
party] must respond to the summary judgment motion with specific facts showing that there is a

17

genuine issue for trial.” Tuttle v. Sudenga Indus., Inc., 125 Idaho 145, 150, 868 P.2d 473, 478
(1994).
The non-moving party has the obligation of establishing the existence of each element
essential to any claims they have made in which they bear the burden of proof at trial. This
obligation has been imposed by the United States Supreme Court in applying Rule 56(c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the case of Cellotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
The Idaho Supreme Court has adopted Cellotex in the application of Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure 56(c). See, Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101,102 (1998). In Cellotex, Justice Renquist
wrote for the majority and explained:
The plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of Summary Judgment, after
adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a
situation, there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since a complete
failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party’s case
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving party is entitled to a
Judgment as a matter of law . . . 477 U.S. at 322-323.
In the present case the District Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Farm
Bureau concerning the undisputed facts that Appellant violated the 1-year non-competition clause
which made him ineligible to receive the Service Bonus Commission. However, the District court
improperly granted summary judgment in favor of Appellant on Farm Bureau’s counterclaims of
a violation of the Idaho Trade Secrets Act and interference with prospective economic advantage,
because a genuine issue of material facts exists concerning these claims.

18

In granting summary judgment in favor of Farm Bureau concerning Appellant’s violation
of the 1-year non-competition clause, the District Court properly found that Appellant admitted
that he had competed within about 4 months of the termination of his contract. Because there was
no dispute of facts concerning Appellant’s actions of failing to complete the 1-year noncompetition period, the granting of summary judgment by the District Court holding that Appellant
was not eligible for the Service Bonus Commission is supported by the record and remains
undisputed.
However, the undisputed facts on the record do not support the District Court’s entering
summary judgment against Farm Bureau on its counterclaims. Rather, the undisputed facts on the
record support Farm Bureau’s counterclaims that Appellant violated the Idaho Trade Secrets Act
and that he intentionally interfered with Farm Bureau’s expected economic interests. As a result,
this Court should reverse the District Court’s decision and grant summary judgment in favor of
Farm Bureau on its counterclaims against the Appellant.

II.

THE PLAIN LANGUAGE EVIDENCES THAT FARM BUREAU IS FREE TO
TERMINATE AN AGENT AND STILL REQUIRE COMPLIANCE WITH THE
NON-COMPETITION CLAUSE
When read as a whole, the 2011 Service Bonus Commission MOU evidences that Farm

Bureau is free to terminate an agent who could still qualify to receive a Service Bonus Commission
so long as they fulfill the 1-year non-competition eligibility requirement.

This Court has

repeatedly held that when the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, its interpretation
and legal effect are questions of law. Bakker v. Thunder Spring-Wareham, LLC, 141 Idaho 185,

19

190, 108 P.3d 332, 337 (2005), citing, Lamprecht v. Jordan, LLC, 139 Idaho 182, 185–86, 75 P.3d
743, 746–47 (2003).
Additionally, this Court has also held specifically that “an unambiguous contract will be
given its plain meaning and the purpose of interpreting a contract is to determine the intent of the
contracting parties at the time the contract was entered. In determining the intent of the parties,
this Court must view the contract as a whole.” Id., (emphasis added).
The District Court properly read the 2011 Service Bonus Commission MOU57 as a whole
document and found that the plain language stated that a qualifying, full-time agent under a career
agent’s contract “will be eligible to receive a service bonus commission after termination if the
agent meets the conditions set forth each year and does not compete with [Farm Bureau] for a
period of one year after they have terminated.”58 In his appeal Appellant attempts to persuade this
Court to focus only on few specific words in the document rather than considering the document,
or even the sentences the words are in, as a whole. The plain language of both the sentences and
the document when read as a whole identifies the general terms of eligibility. Specifically, an
agent will “receive a service bonus commission after termination”, so long as the agent meets all
of the eligibility requirements.59
As the District Court correctly analyzed, in terms of eligibility, there is no indication that
agents who elect to terminate themselves are treated any differently from agents whose contracts

57

R. at 742-743; and 249, first full paragraph.
R. at 742 first paragraph.
59
R. at 742-743.
58
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are terminated by Farm Bureau. The District Court correctly reasoned, “[u]nder [Appellant’s]
interpretation, an agent whose contract is terminated by [Farm Bureau] would not be eligible to
receive any service bonus commission, because the [2011 Service Bonus Commission MOU]
contains no separate statement defining eligibility under that circumstance.”60 It would be easy for
Farm Bureau to agree with Appellant’s argument, which if reasoned to its conclusion would lead
to no Service Bonus Commission being paid at any time that Farm Bureau terminates an agent,
including Appellant. However, this is clearly not the intent of the document. When read as a
whole, the intent of the 2011 Service Bonus Commission MOU is clear. A Service Bonus
Commission will be paid to each “qualifying” and “eligible” agent regardless of whether they
terminate themselves or Farm Bureau terminates them so long as they fulfill all the listed eligibility
requirements, including the 1-year non-competition clause.61
There is only one interpretation that can be understood from reading the 2011 Service
Bonus Commission MOU as a whole. The plain language evidences that Farm Bureau is free to
terminate an agent and still require that agent to abide by the 1-year non-competition clause to be
eligible to receive a Service Bonus Commission. Given the plain language when read as a whole
as required by Idaho law this Court should agree with the District Court and disregard Appellant’s
arguments by denying Appellant’s appeal.
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R. at 249.
R. at 742-743.
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III.

THE NONCOMPETE AND FORFEITURE PROVISIONS ARE ENFORCABLE
PURSUANT TO THE UNDISPUTED FACTS AND APPLICABLE LAW
Both the 1-year non-competition clause and the forfeiture provision in the 2011 Service

Bonus Commission MOU are enforceable. Appellant’s argument that the law applied by the
District Court is not “controlling” is incredible. While it’s true that this Court can create a new
statement of law, until it does so, existing appellate decisions are controlling. State v. Austin, 163
Idaho 378, 381, 413 P.3 778, 781 (2018). The District Court’s reliance on Anderson v. Farm
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 112 Idaho 461, 732 P.2d 699 (Ct. App. 1987), is well founded
because it is an Idaho appellate case that is exactly on point with the undisputed facts in the present
case.
In Anderson, an insurance agent who was terminated by the insurance company, argued
that interrelated non-competition and forfeiture clauses in a service bonus commission document
similar to what exists in the present case, should be unenforceable because they violated anticompetition and restraint of trade laws. The Idaho Court of Appeals rejected these arguments.
The Idaho Court of Appeals held that “the provisions set forth in the contracts before us are not
restrictive covenants .. . . They do not prohibit competition; they simply impose contractual
forfeitures. Provisions of this type generally are not considered restraints of trade.” Anderson,
112 Idaho 461, 470 732 P.2d 699, 708. The Idaho Court of Appeals did state, “Concededly, these
forfeitures impose a cost for engaging in competition. But the agent, through his competitive
activity, mitigates the cost by soliciting customers to buy insurance from the new carriers he
represents.” Id. The Anderson court then cited several decisions by courts in other jurisdictions
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applying the same rationale in concluding that such forfeiture provisions were enforceable and
were distinguishable from covenants not to compete contained in employment contracts and noted
that the “strong weight” of judicial authority upholds such agreements even when they are
unrestricted in time or territory.” Id.
Appellant makes several arguments about why he believes the 1-year non-competition
clause and the forfeiture provision in the 2011 Service Bonus Commission MOU are not
enforceable. In doing so, Appellant ignores both the undisputed facts and law applicable to this
case. Each of Appellant’s arguments are responded to separately below. As a result of the
undisputed facts and law, this Court should uphold the District Court’s decision and deny
Appellant’s appeal.
A. APPELLANT WAS NOT AN EMPLOYEE OF FARM BUREAU
In the present case, the first thing that needs to be noted and responded to through the
undisputed facts is that the Appellant in both his Complaint, and again throughout his Appellant’s
Brief, inexplicably asserts several times that he was “employed” by Farm Bureau, or that
employment related laws, such as the “employee choice doctrine” or “reasonableness laws” should
apply to him. However, the undisputed facts and the admissions from the Appellant are that he
was an independent contractor and not an employee.62
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R. at 28, paragraph 2; R. at 723, paragraph 6; and R. at 643, paragraph 12.
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Further, it is undisputed that the 1-year non-competition clause and the forfeiture clauses
contained in the 2011 Service Bonus Commission MOU, are not tied to any existing
employer/employee relationship between the parties. The undisputed fact that Appellant was not
an employee of Farm Bureau is important because it invalidates many of the arguments and the
law Appellant attempts to persuade this Court to follow.
The Anderson Court understood the difference between an employee and an independent
contractor when analyzing non-competition and forfeiture clauses. Based on this difference, the
Anderson Court held that the non-competition and forfeiture clauses in the Anderson case were
not tied to an employer/employee relationship but were simply contract clauses that were
enforceable. Anderson, 112 Idaho 461, 470 732 P.2d 699, 708.
The District Court in the present case also understood the undisputed facts which are that
Appellant was an independent contractor and not an employee. 63 In applying the Anderson
decision in the present case the District Court specifically held that the clauses in the 2011 Service
Bonus Commission MOU were not subject to the same analysis as a non-competition covenant in
an employment contract.64 As a result, the District Court correctly applied Anderson, to the present
case and determined that both the 1-year non-competition clause and the forfeiture clause in the
2011 Service Bonus Commission MOU were enforceable as a matter of law.
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R. at 246.
R. at 250-251.
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Based on the undisputed facts, no employment related theories, arguments, laws or
conclusions are applicable in this case and all such should be ignored by this Court, as they were
by the District Court. In ignoring all employment related theories, arguments, laws or conclusions,
this Court should uphold the District Court’s decision and deny Appellant’s appeal.

B. APPELLANT HAD NOT “EARNED” A SERVICE BONUS COMMISSION
Second, Appellant asserts that a “reasonableness standard” should be applied to both the
1-year non-competition clause and the forfeiture clause in the 2011 Service Bonus Commission
MOU because the forfeiture amount is “significantly large”.65 In support of this assertion,
Appellant repeatedly argues that he had already “earned” the Service Bonus Commission he is
demanding to be paid.66 Appellant further assets that the Service Bonus Commission at issue in
the present case was not only “earned” but that it was somehow also “vested”.67

These

characterizations of the status of the Service Bonus Commission are not supported by the
undisputed facts on the record.
The undisputed facts based on the plain language of the 2011 Service Bonus Commission
MOU are that a qualifying agent would have a “service bonus commission credit” upon completing
a qualifying service year.68 This credit would be placed on deposit with interest. However, it is
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See pages 16-17 of Appellant’s Brief.
See pages 15, 18, 20, and 21 of Appellant’s Brief.
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undisputed that “[t]he commission credit made on behalf of each agent and interest will not become
payable to agent . . . until the agent complies with all other requirements of the plan, terminates,
and fulfills the no competition requirements.”69 If this doesn’t happen, then the commission credits
revert back to Farm Bureau. No matter how Appellant argues it, or asserts it, or claims it, or tries
to characterize it with creative words that don’t apply, the facts on the record remain undisputed
from the plain language that exists.
Moreover, the arguments and citations of law from other jurisdictions Appellant sets forth
in his brief concerning “earned and vested” money and using a “reasonableness standard” are once
again directly tied to an employer/employee relationship, which the undisputed facts on the record
evidence does not exist in the present case. In an effort to persuade this Court, Appellant asserts
that the Anderson, case which is exactly on point, is distinguishable and should not be applied.
However, the reality is, the citations of law from other jurisdictions relied on by Appellant
involving

a

direct

employer/employee

relationship

are

distinguishable

because

no

employer/employee relationship exists in the present case. As a result, all claims, assertions and
arguments by Appellant that he somehow “earned” the Service Bonus Commission or that it was
“vested” are irrelevant and should be rejected by this Court, just as they were by the District Court.
Based on this, Appellant’s appeal should be denied.

69

R. at 743, first full paragraph.
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C. LIQUIDATED DAMAGES DOES NOT APPLY
Next, Appellant asserts that the forfeiture language in the 2011 Service Bonus Commission
MOU is a liquidated damages clause. Appellant made this same argument to the District Court
two separate times. In analyzing this claim for the first time, the District Court relied on the
Anderson case, where the same argument had been raised. 70 In relying on Anderson, the District
Court decided against the Appellant and held that the forfeiture clause in the 2011 Service Bonus
Commission MOU was not a liquidated damages clause. The District Court’s reasoning is sound.
Unlike a true liquidated damages clause that would be triggered by a “breach” of a contract, as
defined by the citations used by Appellant, the forfeiture clause in the 2011 Service Bonus
Commission MOU is a result of an agent not being “eligible” for the Service Bonus Commission
because they failed to fulfill all of the eligibility requirements, such as the 1-year non-competition
clause.
The second time the District Court analyzed Appellant’s argument was in a decision on a
motion for reconsideration.

In this decision, the District Court concluded that “the non-

competition provision in the 2011 [Service Bonus Commission MOU] is not a liquidated damages
clause” because it was not triggered by any type of a “breach”. Rather, the District Court held that
“the non-competition provision in the 2011 [Service Bonus Commission MOU] is a condition of

70

R. at 251-252.
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eligibility to receive a service bonus commission, rather than a contractual promise on the part of
the agent that would be breached by the agent engaging in competition.”71
In analyzing both of Appellant’s arguments, the District Court reviewed the plain language
of the 2011 Service Bonus Commission MOU as a whole, and relied on Anderson to correctly
conclude that “provisions of this type ‘do not prohibit competition; they simply impose contractual
forfeitures.’”72 As a result, the District Court correctly concluded that the 2011 Service Bonus
Commission MOU was not a liquidated damages agreement in either form or substance.73
Throughout his brief Appellant also argues again and again that the “dishonesty provision”
in the 2011 Service Bonus Commission MOU is impermissible.74 For the reasons set forth below,
Appellant’s “dishonesty provision” arguments are irrelevant anyway because Appellant admitted
that he competed against Farm Bureau in violation of the 1-year non-competition clause. By
competing, Appellant has admitted that he did not fulfil all of the eligibility requirements in the
2011 Service Bonus Commission MOU making any arguments for or against the “dishonesty
provision” moot. As a result, this Court should uphold the District Court’s decision by denying
Appellant’s appeal.
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D. UNCONSCIONABILITY DOES NOT APPLY
Finally, Appellant asserts that the forfeiture provision in the 2011 Service Bonus
Commission MOU is unconscionable as a matter of law. The argument Appellant makes to this
Court is nearly identical to the argument he made to the District Court.75 In response to Appellant’s
argument, the District Court correctly found that Appellant cited to no facts in the record through
which it could make a decision.76 The same is true now. Appellant has cited to nothing in the
record to support its claim of unconscionability. Rather, Appellant only asserts or argues that there
is no bargained for or signed contract, and that there is a disparity of bargaining positions, and that
the terms are oppressive.77
Under the summary judgment standard of review, party cannot prevail on a claim when it
fails to provide any proof on the record to support that claim. Based on Appellant’s failure to cite
this Court to any facts in the record in support of its argument, this Court should uphold the District
Court’s decision that the 2011 Service Bonus Commission MOU is not unconscionable and should
deny Appellant’s appeal.
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IV.

NONE OF THE DOCTRINES RELIED UPON BY APPELLANT ARE
APPLICABLE CONCERNING FARM BUREAU’S STATEMENTS
The undisputed facts establishing the “eligibility” requirements of the 2011 Service Bonus

Commission MOU evidence that Farm Bureau’s statements to Appellant are irrelevant and are
now moot. Appellant tries to use the record of Farm Bureau’s statements made to Appellant when
his contract was terminated as evidence that he was somehow immediately excused from fulfilling
the 1-year non-competition clause. Further, Appellant asserts several arguments to try and
persuade this Court that not only was he excused from the 1-year non-competition clause
requirement but also that Farm Bureau somehow had an immediate duty to pay him the Service
Bonus Commission at issue in this case.
The relevant facts are summarized as follows: Farm Bureau learned of conduct and actions
taken by Appellant that it believed were dishonest. As a result, on May 4, 2016, in a meeting with
Appellant, the Career Agent’s Contract was terminated which ended Appellant’s position as an
agent of Farm Bureau. Appellant was told in this meeting that due to his dishonest conduct and
based on the language in the 2011 Service Bonus Commission MOU, Appellant would not receive
a Service Bonus Commission.78
On May 5, 2016, Appellant’s counsel sent a letter to Farm Bureau requesting that it restore
Appellant as an agent, and further requesting that Farm Bureau immediately pay to Appellant the
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See Appellant’s Brief pages 6-7.
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Service Bonus Commission.79 In response, on May 9, 2016, Farm Bureau’s counsel sent a letter
to Appellant,80 stating that Appellant would not be reinstated as an agent by Farm Bureau.
Additionally, in response to Appellant’s request for the immediate payment of the Service Bonus
Commission, the letter cites to the language in the 2011 Service Bonus Commission MOU about
the bonus not being paid when the agent is involved in dishonest conduct. The dishonest conduct
Farm Bureau believed Appellant had participated in was then described. The letter then states,
“Further, even if [Appellant] were entitled to his service bonus, the Memorandum contains a noncompetition clause restricting payment until after compliance for a 12-month period.”81
Based on these undisputed facts on the record, Farm Bureau will address each of the legal
assertions and arguments made by Appellant to rebut his claim that he was somehow relieved of
his duty to fulfill every eligibility requirement of the 2011 Service Bonus Commission MOU,
including the 1-year non-competition clause and that Farm Bureau had an immediate duty to pay
the Service Bonus Commission.
A. QUASI-ESTOPPEL IS NOT APPLICABLE
The doctrine of quasi estoppel does not apply to this case because the undisputed facts
evidence that Farm Bureau’s position has been consistent. Farm Bureau accepts Appellant’s
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R. at 371-376.
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statement of the law on the doctrine of quasi estoppel82 and incorporates the same herein by
reference as if set forth fully.
The undisputed facts in this case evidence that from the beginning Farm Bureau stated its
position as being that Appellant must fulfill all of the eligibility requirements of the 2011 Service
Bonus Commission MOU in order to receive the Service Bonus Commission. When terminating
Appellant’s contract, Farm Bureau stated that it believed Appellant had engaged in dishonest
conduct which violated one of the eligibility requirements.83 Farm Bureau’s management was
consistent in their testimony concerning this fact, which was described to Appellant when his
contract was terminated.84 Appellant was then specifically told by Farm Bureau’s counsel that
“even if [Appellant] were entitled to his service bonus, the [2011 Service Bonus Memorandum]
contains a non-competition clause restricting payment until after compliance for a 12-month
period.”85 In other words, even if dishonesty were not an issue, Appellant would still have to fulfill
the 1-year non-competition clause eligibility requirement.
During the course of this litigation, Farm Bureau learned that Appellant had violated the
1-year non-competition clause eligibility requirement in the 2011 Service Bonus Memorandum by
competing with Farm Bureau.86 Appellant admitted in his affidavit to competing with Farm
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Bureau just a little over 90 days after his contract was terminated.87 When it learned of this, Farm
Bureau sought summary judgment against Appellant arguing that he had admitted to competing
with Farm Bureau before 1 year had passed and as a result of his admission he was not eligible for
the Service Bonus Commission.88
The District Court’s decision agreed with Farm Bureau. The District Court correctly held
that Appellant was required “to fulfill all the clearly stated eligibility requirements before [he] is
eligible to receive a service bonus commission.”89 Further, the District Court correctly found from
the facts that it was “undisputed that [Appellant] began competing with [Farm Bureau] less than
one year after his Contract was terminated.”90 As a result, the District Court held that through his
failure “to comply with all the eligibility requirements set forth in the [2011 Service Bonus
Commission MOU]” Appellant had “forfeited payment of the service bonus commission.”91
Further, the District Court correctly found that Farm Bureau had been consistent in its
position that Appellant was required to fulfill all eligibility requirements.92 Appellant was
reminded in a letter he received every year from Farm Bureau that all requirements of the program
would have to be met.93 These facts are undisputed on the record. Appellant’s arguments that
Farm Bureau took inconsistent positions is not supported by the record but rather is simply an
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assertion. Based on this, the District Court was correct. “[T]he present facts do not satisfy the
elements of quasi-estoppel.” As a result, this Court should uphold the District Court’s decision
and deny Appellant’s appeal.
B. THERE IS NO ANTICIPATORY REPUDIATION
In addition to the above, the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation also does not apply to the
present case due to both the eligibility requirements in the 2011 Service Bonus Commission MOU
and Appellant’s actions in preserving his rights by immediately filing his lawsuit against Farm
Bureau. Farm Bureau accepts the citations of law concerning anticipatory repudiation used by the
District Court in its decision and incorporates the same herein by reference as if set forth fully.94
It is undisputed that Appellant’s contract with Farm Bureau was terminated on May 4,
2016. It is also undisputed that on May 9, 2016, Appellant was informed by Farm Bureau’s counsel
that the 1-year non-competition clause still applied. Appellant filed his lawsuit against Farm
Bureau just a few weeks later, on May 23, 2016. Further, it is undisputed that after being fully
informed that the 1-year non-competition clause still applied to him and after filing his lawsuit to
preserve his rights, Appellant then began competing with Farm Bureau on August 10, 2016.
By filing his lawsuit in May 2016, Appellant had preserved his rights, and a legal
determination could now be made about whether Farm Bureau’s statements and beliefs that
Appellant had been dishonest were true. If Farm Bureau was wrong, then Appellant would still

94

R. at 909-910.
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be “eligible” for the Service Bonus Commission so long as he fulfilled all other requirements.
However, several months later, before a determination had been made by the District Court about
the dishonesty issue, Appellant began competing against Farm Bureau in violation of the 1-year
non-competition clause.

Appellant “claims” that he would have complied with the 1-year

noncompetition clause to receive his Service Bonus Commission but for the statements made to
him by Farm Bureau.95 However, this testimony contradicts his earlier admission that his financial
situation was poor and that he “simply cannot live off [a settlement amount] of $50,000 for a year
while supporting his family.”96
There is no evidence on the record to support Appellant’s claims that an anticipatory
repudiation occurred. On the other hand, the undisputed facts on the record evidence that
Appellant was reminded that the 1-year non-competition clause applied to him. Further, it is
undisputed that Appellant had preserved his rights through filing a lawsuit before he chose to
compete against Farm Bureau. Additionally, it is undisputed that Appellant chose to compete
because his finances would not allow him to wait 1 year without competing in order to get his
Service Bonus Commission.

As a result, the District Court’s decision that there was no

anticipatory repudiation is correct and should be upheld by this Court. Based on this, Appellant’s
appeal should be denied.
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R. at 854.
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C. FUTILITY DOES NOT APPLY
The doctrine of futility does not apply because the undisputed facts evidence that had
Appellant fulfilled all of the eligibility requirements and the district court determined that he had
not been dishonest, he would have been eligible to receive the Service Bonus Commission as a
matter of law. Farm Bureau accepts the citations of law concerning the doctrine of futility used
by the District Court in its decision and incorporates the same herein by reference as if set forth
fully.97
In the present case, Appellant asserts that he was “excused” from fulfilling the 1-year noncompetition clause because of the statements by Farm Bureau that Appellant had been dishonest.
Appellant claims that if he had fulfilled the 1-year non-competition clause “he would have nothing
to show for it because Farm Bureau had already declared that it would not pay and had no
‘contractual obligation’ to pay the service bonus commissions.”98
The District Court correctly found that Appellant’s “adherence to the [2011 Service Bonus
Commission MOU]’s eligibility requirements would have preserved [Appellant’s] claim to the
service bonus commission and allowed him to challenge [Farm Bureau’s] assertion that he acted
dishonestly . . ..”99 The District Court also correctly concluded that if a jury found that Appellant
had not committed misconduct, he would have been eligible to receive the Service Bonus
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Commission because “satisfaction of the eligibility requirements would have given rise to [Farm
Bureau’s] duty to pay the bonus.”100 As a result of this, Appellant’s compliance would not have
been a futile act. The District Court correctly rejected Appellant’s argument of futility “as a matter
of law under the undisputed facts of this case . . ..”101
As the District Court correctly found, the undisputed facts do not support any assertion of
the doctrine of futility. Appellant could have preserved his rights to continue to seek payment of
the Service Bonus Commission by complying with the 1-year non-competition clause. The
undisputed record is that Appellant did not do this. Rather, it was because of financial reasons,
rather than depending on the doctrine of futility that Appellant competed with Farm Bureau in
violation of the 1-year non-competition clause.102 Regardless of the reason, by competing,
Appellant failed to fulfill all the eligibility requirements. As a result, this Court should find that
the doctrine of futility does not apply to this case and deny Appellant’s appeal.
CROSS APPEAL ARGUMENT
V.

APPELLANT VIOLATED THE IDAHO TRADE SECRETS ACT
Appellant’s admissions on the record evidence that he violated the Idaho Trade Secrets Act

for which Farm Bureau should receive a judgment for damages. The Idaho Trade Secrets Act,
(hereafter the “ITSA”), which is codified at Idaho Code §§ 48-801 et seq., is specifically designed
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to protect proprietary information that a business develops during its operation. The ITSA sets
forth the following definition: (5) “Trade secret” means information, including a formula, pattern,
compilation, program, computer program, device, method, technique or process, that: (a) Derives
independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being
readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its
disclosure or use. Basic Am. v. Shatila, 133 Idaho 726, 734-735 (Idaho 1999), citing, I.C. § 48801(5)(a)-(b).
Specifically, this Court has held that “customer lists, lists showing customer buying
preferences, [and] the history of customer purchases, . . . are trade secrets.” Wesco Autobody
Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, 149 Idaho 881, 898, 243 P.3d 1069, 1086 (2010).
According to the courts, there are no technical limitations on the nature of the conduct that
constitutes “use” of a trade secret. As a general matter, any exploitation of the trade secret that is
likely to result in injury to the trade secret owner or enrichment to the other party is a “use”. “Thus,
marketing goods that embody the trade secret, employing the trade secret in manufacturing or
production, relying on the trade secret to assist or accelerate research or development, or soliciting
customers through the use of information that is a trade secret all constitute ‘use.’” JustMed, Inc.
v. Byce, 600 F.3d 1118, 1130 (9th Cir. 2010)(emphasis added).
In the present case, Appellant’s own admissions evidence that he violated the ITSA to the
detriment of Farm Bureau. While Appellant asserts to this Court that he did not “use any Farm
Bureau records or data to create the Subject List”, his admissions contradict his assertions.
Appellant affirmatively admits in his own affidavit that “a few names on the Subject List
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(approximately 20 or so) came from my old commission statements and calendars.”103 When
asked about this during his deposition, Appellant then admitted that 20-30 names on what he claims
to be his self-created “Subject List” came from calendars and commission statements that he had
obtained while working as an agent for Farm Bureau.104
The undisputed record evidences that the commission statements are a customer list that
shows customer buying preferences and the history of customer purchases.105 According to Wesco,
this data is proprietary and is a trade secret. Appellant admitted that he obtained and used the
commission statements to create the list while he was under his contract with Defendant Farm
Bureau.106 Further, Appellant also admitted that his “Subject List” was created from names and
contact information that he obtained from the proprietary renewal notices his office received from
Farm Bureau while he was working as an agent.107 Appellant testified that these renewal notices
were designed to help create renewal letters that would be sent out to clients so they would renew
their policies with Farm Bureau.108 Appellant made it a point to testify that the renewal lists were
not sent to him individually but rather were sent to his office for the “gals that worked for Farm
Bureau” “to send out renewal letters letting clients know, hey it’s time to do your renewal.”109
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Appellant also admits that Farm Bureau specifically warned him that any data that included
client lists was proprietary and was protected by the ITSA.110 Finally, Appellant admitted that he
used his “Subject List” when he competed against Farm Bureau.111
Farm Bureau had actual customers and clients leave as a result of Appellant’s use of the
trade secret protected client lists. Farm Bureau was damaged by Appellant’s violation of the ITSA
in the amount of $230,000.00.112 The undisputed facts on the record support Farm Bureau’s
argument that both a violation of the ITSA occurred and that it resulted in damages to Farm Bureau.
However, despite the undisputed record set forth above, the District Court dismissed Farm
Bureau’s ITSA claim.113 The District Court erroneously determined that Farm Bureau had not
taken reasonable steps to protect its client lists.114 Further, the District Court erroneously
determined that Appellant had not misappropriated any trade secrets.115
Based upon the undisputed record, the decision of the District Court in dismissing Farm
Bureau’s claims that Appellant violated the ITSA and damaged Farm Bureau, should be reversed,
and judgment should be entered in Farm Bureau’s favor on this issue. At the very least, this Court
should find that a genuine issue of material fact exists sufficient for this issue to go to trial. Farm
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Bureau respectfully requests that this Court reverse the District Court’s judgment and enter a
decision in its favor.

VI.

APPELLANT INTERFERED
ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE

WITH

FARM

BUREAU’S

PROSPECTIVE

In addition to violating the ITSA, Appellant’s admissions also evidence that he
intentionally interfered with contracts Farm Bureau had with current clients and customers that he
knew provided an economic advantage to Farm Bureau. To establish a claim for intentional
interference with a prospective economic advantage, the party asserting the claim must show: (1)
the existence of a valid economic expectancy, (2) knowledge of the expectancy on the part of the
interferer, (3) intentional interference inducing termination of the expectancy, (4) the interference
was wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the interference itself, and (5) resulting damage
to the party whose expectancy has been disrupted. Cantwell v. the City of Boise, et al, 146 Idaho
127, 138, 191 P.3d 205, 216 (2008).
To establish that the intentional interference resulting in injury was wrongful, the party
asserting the claim may offer proof that either: “(1) the defendant had an improper objective or
purpose to harm the plaintiff; or (2) the defendant used a wrongful means to cause injury to the
prospective business relationship.” Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho
266, 286, 824 P.2d 841, 861 (1991). However, an enforceable contract need not be shown to exist,
just a valid economic expectancy. Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M. & Lynn Lea Family Trust,
145 Idaho 208, 217, 177 P.3d 955, 964 (2008).
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In the present case, Appellant’s testimony and admissions create undisputed facts
evidencing that he intentionally interfered with Farm Bureau’s economic advantage. Appellant
affirmatively admits in his own affidavit that “a few names on the Subject List (approximately 20
or so) came from my old commission statements and calendars.”116 When asked about this during
his deposition, Appellant then admitted that 20-30 names on what he claims to be his self-created
“Subject List”117 came from calendars and commission statements that he had obtained while
working as an agent for Farm Bureau.118 Further, Appellant also admitted that his “Subject List”
was created from names and contact information that he obtained from the proprietary renewal
notices his office received from Farm Bureau while he was working as an agent.119 Appellant
testified that these renewal notices were designed to help create renewal letters that would be sent
out to clients so they would renew their policies with Farm Bureau. 120 Appellant made it a point
to testify that the renewal lists were not sent to him individually but rather were sent to his office
for the “gals that worked for Farm Bureau” “to send out renewal letters letting clients know, hey
it’s time to do your renewal.”121
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Appellant also admits that Farm Bureau specifically warned him that any data that included
client lists was proprietary and was protected by the ITSA.122 Finally, Appellant admitted that he
used his “Subject List” when he competed against Farm Bureau.123 Specifically, Appellant
admitted that he sent the letters “requesting that the contacted individuals appoint him as their
agent.”124 Appellant admitted that as a result of his letter, some of these individuals then cancelled
their policy with Farm Bureau.125 As a result of these admissions, the undisputed record evidences
that Appellant’s conduct was wrongful because it violated the ITSA.
Moreover, Appellant knew he was sending the Solicitation Letter to individuals who were
currently insured by Farm Bureau which is evidenced by the references in the letter to Farm
Bureau.126 Additional undisputed evidence incudes the Information Release Form Appellant
included with his Solicitation Letter. It cannot be disputed that the Information Release Form is
specifically designed to gather “5 year loss runs” the “latest complete declaration pages” and the
“most current annual audit” from Farm Bureau.127 Because of these specific references to Farm
Bureau in his letter and documentation it is ridiculous for Appellant to assert, or claim, or argue
that he was not interfering with existing contracts Farm Bureau had with current clients.
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R. at 641, paragraph 2, and 646-647.
R. at 642, paragraph 8.
124
R. at 666, paragraph 5.
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Id.
126
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R. at 698.
123

43

Had the Appellant simply done as he claimed in his arguments to the District Court and
created a list by using the Ada County Assessor’s webpage, or some other generally available
source, he wouldn’t have included the Information Release Form specifically naming and targeting
Farm Bureau. If this were the case, there would be no wrongdoing. However, the undisputed
record does not support Appellant’s claims. The undisputed record evidences that Appellant
targeted Farm Bureau current clients he knew Farm Bureau had existing contracts with.
Additionally, the undisputed record evidences that Farm Bureau suffered damages in the amount
of $230,000.00.128
Despite the undisputed record set forth above which satisfies all of the required elements
for this cause of action, the District Court erroneously dismissed Farm Bureau’s claim that
Appellant intentionally interfered with contracts Farm Bureau had with existing clients.129 The
District Court erroneously decided that because Appellant had not violated the ITSA, his conduct
in targeting Farm Bureau’s current clients with his letter and documents was not “improper”.
Additionally, the District Court erroneously focused on Appellant’s testimony that he was trying
to notify as many people as possible that he was now working for a competitor of Farm Bureau
rather than interfering with existing contracts by targeting Farm Bureau’s clients, “despite
references to Farm Bureau in the [Information Release Form].”

128
129

R. at 694.
R. at 892.
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Based upon the undisputed record, the decision of the District Court in dismissing Farm
Bureau’s claims that Appellant intentionally interfered and economically damaged Farm Bureau,
should be reversed, and judgment should be entered in Farm Bureau’s favor on this issue. At the
very least, this Court should find that a genuine issue of material fact exists sufficient for this issue
to go to trial. Farm Bureau respectfully requests that this Court reverse the judgment of the District
Court and enter a decision in its favor.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, it is respectfully requested that the District Court’s decisions
granting summary judgment in favor of Farm Bureau be upheld, and the District Court’s decisions
granting summary judgment against Farm Bureau on the issues of Appellant’s violations of the
ITSA and interference with Farm Bureau’s economic advantage be reversed. Additionally, it is
respectfully requested that Farm Bureau be awarded their attorney fees and costs on appeal.

DATED this 11th day of January, 2019.
RACINE OLSON PLLP
By:
/s/Lane V. Erickson
LANE V. ERICKSON, of the firm
Attorneys for Respondents

45

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 11 th day of January, 2019, I served a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows:
Corey J. Rippee
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW
& MCKLEVEEN, Chartered
P.O. Box 1368
Boise, Idaho 83701-1368

[

Michelle R. Points
910 W. Main St., Suite 222
Boise, Idaho 83702

U.S. Mail
Postage Prepaid
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Facsimile
[ X] iCourt/E-mail
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